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Throughout its modern history, Japan has conceived of itself as
ethnically one. Various explanations account for this politics of
ethnic homogeneity: geographical isolation from the rest of Asia;
self-imposed closure to the rest of the world; and a cultural
disposition that is introverted, communitarian-minded, or simply
xenophobic. 1 Each theory may reflect aspects of a broader tmth,

t

Lecturer-in-Law and Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School; Senior Fellow, China
Law Center. I am grateful to my audiences at the University of North Carolina School of
Law, and the University of Washington School of Law for their perceptive feedback. I
thank Morgan Davis, Stacey Allred, and the rest of the editmial staff at the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation for their editorial
suggestions and gracious hospitality.
I See generally TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI, BORDERLINE JAPAN 10-11 (2010)
(discussing various theories to explain Japan's "closed country" mindset); Tessa MorrisSuzuki, Immigration and Citizenship in ContemporaiJ' Japan, in JAPAN - CHANGE &
CONTINUITY, 163, 171-72 (Javed Maswood, Jeffrey Graham & Hideaki Miyajima eds.,
2002) (discussing Japan's modem "cosmetic multiculturalism" that recognizes limited
diversity and the constraints of xenophobia); John Lie, The Discourse of Japaneseness,
in JAPAN & GLOBAL MIGRATION: FOREIGN WoRKERS AND THE ADVENT OF A
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but they collectively overlook the institutional features of Japan's
ethnic homogeneity. This paper suggests that a matrix of laws and
policies from the late nineteenth cenhny to the present
simultaneously privileges ethnic Japanese and subordinates other
ethnic groups. Numerous laws and regulations decide who
belongs in Japan, who qualifies for citizenship, and who deserves
legal protection under Japanese law. 2 Focusing on the institutional
factors of the "ethno-state," this article examines practices and
decisions of the contemporary Japanese state and its policies to
deal with other ethnicities.
After discussing the historical manifestations of the ethnostate, this article posits a meaningful role for intemational human
rights law ("IHRL") in entrenching the rights of ethnic minorities
in Japan. Though IHRL cannot possibly solve all of Japan's racial
and ethnic problems, it has alleviated many of them, and it has the
potential to do so for others. 3 Since the early 1980s, when it
signed many intemational instruments, Japan has increasingly
confom1ed to the basic principles of IHRL, both revising
discriminatory laws and instituting new, more protective ones. 4
Yet even when Japan does not change its laws and policies, IHRL
can provide plaintiffs a legal basis, additional moral suasion, and a
broader panoply of standards by which to evaluate state policy,
MULTrCULTURAL SOCIETY 70, 84 (Mike Douglass & Glenda S. Roberts eds., 2000) ("The
central conclusion and the fundamental assumption of all Nihonjinron writings are that
Japanese people and culture are different, even unique.").
2 See inji-a Pati I (analyzing the Japanese Constitution, election laws, refugee
policies, Immigration Acts, and other laws and policies dealing with foreigners and their
legal status in Japan).
3 See inFa Part II (discussing three types of cases in which minorities have
successfully used and Japanese judges have cited to international human rights law to
challenge domestic discriminatory policies).

4 By 1980, Japan had signed only two of the major international human rights
conventions, but by 1999, Japan had ratified many of the important human rights
instruments, such as the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
See Univ. of Minn., Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties -Japan, UNIV.
OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY,

http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-japan.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2011 ). See also Timothy Webster, Reconstructing Japanese Lmv: International Norms
and Domestic Legislation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211 (2008), for a discussion of the
attempts and prospects of incorporating international human rights law into national and
local1aws banning racial discrimination.

2011]

INSULAR MINORITIES

559

administrative action, and other instrumentalities of the state.
IHRL is no panacea to all of Japan's ills, but its ratification has led
to notable victmies for minority plaintiffs, a forum to challenge
state laws and policies, and occasional condemnation or legislative
guidance. 5 International law has helped Japan recognize ethnic
others, improve its treatment of them, and endow them with
ce1iain unalienable rights. 6
This paper proceeds in two pmis. Pmi I explains how Japan
has actively promoted an ethnically homogenous state, beginning
with a brief detour of critical race theory as developed in the
United States. From the Meiji pe1iod onward, the Japanese
government has implemented a wide range of laws and policies to
assimilate indigenous people, exclude foreign nationals,
denationalize ethnic minorities, weaken legal protections to nonethnic Japanese, and privilege the Japanese diaspora in
i1mnigration policy. 7 The combined effect of such practices has
been an extraordinarily high degree of ethnic homogeneity across
decades, a rise in the status of ethnic Japanese in the count1y's
racial hierarchy, and the hardening of that hierarchy. 8 Part II
investigates the ways that IHRL has challenged aspects of the
ethno-state through two important mechanisms: amending laws
that offend international law and offering a legal basis for etlmic
minority plaintiffs to ground their claims.
I. Japan's Promotion of Ethnic Homogeneity
Before turning to Japan, it is important to realize that the
United States also has a long history of using law to privilege one

5 See infra Part II (analyzing cases in which plaintiffs in Japanese discriminatory
cases have successfully relied on IHRL and judges have used IHRL to support their
holdings).
6 Following Ian Haney Lopez, I deploy a relatively diffuse concept of law,
incorporating not simply legislation passed by the Japanese Diet (legislature), but also
policies promulgated by various ministries in the Cabinet (executive) and judicial
decisions. While this may blur issues such as accountability-for some government
actors are likely more responsible than others-this broad view offers insight into the
panorama of state policies used both to privilege one racial or ethnic group and to
subordinate another. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BYLAW 80 (2d ed. 2006).
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part I.
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ethnic group over others. 9 Critical race theorists have described
the United States as a "racial state" that has limited the privileges
of citizenship and equal protection of the law to white people. 10
Michael Omi and Howard Winant find the State is "inherently
racial," 11 and the main objectives of its racial policy are
"repression and exclusion." 12 For example, the Naturalization Act
of 1790, which restricted U.S. citizenship to "free white persons,"
is reflective of the state's racist inclinations during its foundational
period. 13 Even before this Act, the U.S. Constitution itself
contained the "three-fifths compromise," 14 which excluded
"Indians" in full and reduced by forty percent the number of slaves
to be counted in a state's population to determine congressional
representation. 15 In other words, the Constitution did not view
Native Ameticans and slaves-most of whom were AfricanAmerican-as fully human. 16 They were not considered full
persons for the purpose of assigning representation in the federal
government and were forbidden from the political processes. 17
Racially preferential laws did not end with the early colonial
period. Ian Haney Lopez has excavated laws and court decisions
from the eighteenth to the twentieth century that subordinated
Native Americans, Asians, Asian Americans, and AfricanAmericans to white people in various ways. 18 For instance,
[t]he naturalization laws governed who was and was not
welcome to join the polity, antimiscegenation laws
regulated sexual relations, and segregation laws told people
where they could and could not live and work. Together,

9 See MICHAEL 0MI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATESFROMTHE 1960STOTHE 1990s 81-82 (2ded. 1994).
10 !d. at 81-82.
11 Id. at 82.
12

Id. at 81.

13 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, l Stat. 103, repealed by Naturalization Act of
1795, ch. 20,1 Stat. 414.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
15 James Madison actually proposed the ratio of three-fifths after proposed
compromises of one-half and three-quarters were deemed unsatisfactory. GARRY WILLS,
"NEGRO PRESIDENT" JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 52-54 (2003).
16 See id.
17 Seeid.
18

LOPEZ, supra note 6, at 78-85.
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such laws ... established material conditions of belonging
and exclusion that code as race. In all of these ways, legal
rules constructed race. 19
Haney Lopez highlights several laws and policies policing
boundaries of the racial divide, but does not suggest that law is the
only tool to sublimate whites. 20
Given the long history of racialized laws and policies in the
United States, it is not surprising to find similar policies in other
countries. Japan is a far less ethnically diverse country; among the
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, only Korea and Iceland are more homogenous. 21
Also, Japan has historically been less open to immigration than the
United States. To remark on Japan's etlmic homogeneity is on one
level, to state the obvious. But on another level, it is to comment
on over a centmy of laws and policies that both promote the notion
of a separate and singular Japanese ethnicity and privilege the
position of ethnically Japanese people vis-a-vis ethnic others.
Since the Meiji Period (1868-1912), Japan has enacted a wide
range of policies to produce, and reproduce, an ethnically
homogenous nation-state. 22 By limiting the number of foreigners
allowed into Japan, tightly policing citizenship requirements,
expelling ethnic others, privileging the Japanese diaspora in
immigration policy, assimilating indigenous persons and ethnic
others, and maintaining a rigid refugee regime, the Japanese state
has indelibly shaped the body politic and the body genetic. 23
A. Meiji Period

Japan's policies of ethnic unity date from the late nineteenth
centmy. 24 During the Meiji Period, Japan opened itself up to

19

20

Jd. at 85.
Jd.

See James D. Fearon, Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Countl)', 8 J. ECON.
195 (2003) (showing Japan and Korea are ranked lowest in their region for
etlmic diversity).
21

GRO\VTH

22 Japan's assimilation of the Ainu indigenous people began in the 1870s, while
restrictions on foreign labor began in the late 1890s. See infra, notes 28-32 and
accompanying text (describing restrictions on foreign labor), and notes 41-51 and
accompanying text (describing policies on the Ainu).
23
24

See infra, Parts I.B, I.C, I.D.
See supra note 22.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

562

[Vol. XXXVI

various modes of Western learning: science, technology, military,
medicine, culture, literature, colonialism, and other fields. 25 But it
also implemented policies similar to those taken by Western
powers in matters of immigration and indigenous peoples? 6 Two
groups that concerned the Japanese government were Chinese
laborers and the Ainu-an indigenous population in northern
Japan. 27
In 1899, a few years after defeating China and colonizing
Taiwan, Japan issued two directives to restrict foreign
immigration. 28
The first, an Imperial Ordinance, limited
immigrant labor for the first time in Japan's history, pennitting
foreign migrants to live in Japan, but only if they refrained from
working in a range of low-skilled occupations. 29 A second
directive specified positions forbidden to foreigners, such as
"fanning, fishing, mmmg, constmction, building, [and]
manufacture." 30 Under that directive, foreigners could be tailors,
cloth merchants, servants, knife-grinders, and so forth. 31 These
policies protected Japanese workers from competition in skilled
labor, aiming primarily at one common type of nineteenth-century
immigrant: mainland Chinese who would work for lower wages. 32
Faced with similar fears of inexpensive Chinese labor, the
United States and Australia reacted with even more sweeping
legislation. In the United States, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Acf 3
prohibited not only the immigration of Chinese subjects, but also

25 See JOHN LIE, MULT!ETHNTC JAPAN 36 (200!) ("Catching up with the West was
perhaps the most important prewar national mandate . . . . [L ]eaders acknowledged
Western superiority and sought to emulate the West.").
26 See inji-a notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing legislation in the
United States and Australia that restricted the immigration of the Chinese).
27 See Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using
Constitutional Protection of Japan's Indigenous Ainu People to Iriform Understandings
of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419, 420-425 (2001)
(discussing the Ainu and their history).
28 See MORRIS-SUZUTU, supra note l, at 4!-42.
29

!d. at 42-44 (discussing Imperial Ordinance No. 352 of 1899).

30
31

!d. at 44 (quoting the Ministry of the Interior's Directive No. 42 of 1899).
!d.

32

See id. at 44-45; see also LIE, supra note 25, at !04.

Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (!882) (barring Chinese
laborers from entering the United States) (repealed 1943).
33
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banned their naturalization. It was the only United States law ever
to ban a pmiicular nationality. 34 The White Australia Policy 35
likewise restricted Chinese and other Asian immigrants to the
antipodes. 36 In the late nineteenth century, Japan strode alongside
Western governments, which restricted immigration and imposed
racially selective qualifications for citizenship.
Like those
countries, Japan resisted ethnic dilution by keeping out foreigners,
assimilating indigenous others into more Japanese ways of living,
and thereby privileging the position occupied by ethnic Japanese.
A similar approach to immigration reemerged nearly a century
later, in 1989, when Japan revised its Immigration Control Acf 7
to keep out other Asians while welcoming "back" ethnic Japanese
from countries such as Brazil, Pem, and the United States. 38
Meiji ethnic policy was not solely concerned with foreign
threats, but also targeted ethnic groups within Japan. 39 In the
1870s and 1880s, the Japanese government passed a series of
policies to assimilate, or more specifically, to Japanize the Ainu. 40
Ainu cultural practices, such as tattooing and cremating the dead
in their homes, were prohibited. 41 Likewise, the government

34

See LOPEZ, supra note 6, at 32.

The policy refers to several measures passed by the colonies and federal
government of Australia fi·om the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. For
instance, several Australian colonies excluded Chinese miners during the gold rush of
the 1950s. The Australian federal government's first laws included the Immigration
RestJiction Act of 190 I (which allowed immigration officers to offer written tests in
European languages) and the Naturalization Act of 1903 (which denied citizenship and
the right to vote to non-Europeans).
See generally Catherine Skulan, Australia's
MandatOIJ' Detention of "Unauthorized" Asylum Seekers: HistOIJI, Politics and Analysis
Under International Law, 26 GEO. lMMlG. L.J. 61,66-67 (2006).
35

36

See MORRJS-SUZUKJ, supra note 1, at 163-64.

Immigration Control Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, amended by Law No.
79 of 1989.
37

38 See Bumsoo Kim, From Exclusion to Inclusion? The Legal Treatment of
"Foreigners" in Contemporwy Japan, 24 IMMIGRANTS & MINORJTJES 51, 64 (2006); see
also Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law: International Norms and Domestic
Legislation, 30 MTCH. J. INT'L L. 211, 214-16 (2008) (describing how the Act and
subsequent regulations pe1mitted the children and grandchildren of Japanese nationals to
obtain preferential visa treatment).
39 See RJCHARD SIDDLE, RACE, RESISTANCE AND THE AINu OF JAPAN 114 (1996).

40

See id. at 115-16 (1996).

See Kayano v. Holdcaido Expropriation Committee, 1598
33 (Sapporo D. Ct., Mar. 27, 1997), translated in Mark A. Levin,
41

HANREI JIHO
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bmmed traditional modes of sustenance on· which the Ainu
depended for their survival: fishing with traditional nets, felling
timber, and removing bark from trees. 42
With the passage of the 1899 Hokkaido Former Aborigine
Protection Act, 43 the Japanese government accelerated the
assimilation of the Ainu. 44 The Act itself provided various fonns
of assistance to the Ainu in agriculture (land grants, seeds, tools,
and other supplies), education (buildings and schools), and social
welfare. 45 But despite the beneficent intentions of the law,
scholars have suggested that the emphasis on agriculture sought to
push the Ainu towards more cognizably Japanese pursuit such as
farming, and away from traditional Ainu modes of subsistence
such as fishing and hunting. 46 The provision of seeds and tools
was "limited and haphazard," and the land grants were ineffective
and often significantly smaller than provided by law. 47 Indeed, the
Protection Act was part of a broader web of policies promoting the
"eradication of [Ainu] language, customs and values." 48
Henceforth, the Ainu were to acculturate into Japan by assuming
Japanese names, speaking the Japanese language, and engaging in
farming, day labor, and other ostensibly Japanese jobs. 49 A 193 7
revision to the Act aimed primarily at providing welfare assistance
to the Ainu because the "original objective of the Protection Act,
the Japanization of the Ainu, was seen as having largely been
accomplished." 50 To this day, only about 25,000 people self-

Kayano \'. Hokkaido Expropriation Commirtee, 38 I.L.M. 394 ([999).
treatment of the Ainu appears toward the end of the opinion. !d. at 422.
42 Jd. at 422-23.

Early

43 Holdmido kylidojin hogoho [Holdmido Fom1er Aborigine Protection Act], Law
No. 27, Mar. l, 1899 (Japan), reprinted in SIDDLE, supra note 39, at app. 1, 194-96
(English translation). The name of the legislation itself is quite suggestive. By calling
the Ainu "former aborigines," the Act assetis that the State has successfully integrated
the "aboriginal" Ainu into "modem" Japanese way of living. I d.
44

See LIE, supra note 25, at 92.

See SIDDLE, supra note 39, at 70.
appendix. See id. at 194.
45

46 See LIE, supra note 25, at 92.
47

See SIDDLE, supra note 39, at 71.

48

!d. at 70-71.
Jd.

49

so Id. at 144.

A translation of the law appears in the

2011]

INSULAR MINORITIES

565

identify as Ainu, though perhaps as many as 300,000 Japanese
could claim Ainu ancestry? This suggests that the policies have
limited the number of people who identify as Ainu, while
increasing the number identifying as Japanese. Numerically at
least, the Japanese assimilation ofthe Ainu was a success.

B. Multiethnic Empire (1910-1945)
As Japan's colonial ambitions mounted, however, a more
expansive assimilation policy emerged. Immigration to Japan,
both voluntary and involuntary, grew over the course of its
colonial period (1895-1945), pmiicularly towards the end. 52 With
the annexation of Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, Manchmia in
1931, and Singapore in 1942, Japan led an essentially multiethnic
empire. 53 Japan, however, did not aim to integrate colonial others
with ethnic Japanese. 54 Despite a range of assimilation policies
with varying degrees of success, Japan essentially opposed
assimilation between colonial others and Japanese. 55 Japan sought
to maintain positions of privilege for ethnic Japanese. 56 The
"actual environment of Japanese colonialism was hostile to any
true merger of the Japanese with their dependent peoples," 57 As
manifest in both active discouragement of intem1arriage and
relatively cloistered quarters in the metropole. 58
Despite legal equality between Japanese and colonized
subjects, there was little doubt that the Japanese retained the
positions of power in colonial relations. While there may have
been talk of universal brotherhood and equal treatment (isshi
d6jin) between colonized peoples and Japanese and legal equality

51 See LIE, supra note 25, at 4.
52 See MOKRJS-SUZUKJ, supra note 1, at 42-44 (noting that surprisingly Japan did
not have a centralized system of inunigration control until it took measures during the
end of the nineteenth century when it first acquired a colony, namely Taiwan).
53 See LOYD E. LEE, WORLD WAR 2 IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND THE WAR'S
AFTERMATH, WITH GENERAL THEMES 122 ( 1998).
54 See MORRJS-SUZUKJ, supra note 1, at 42-43.
55 1d.
56 Mark R. Peattie, Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945, in THE
JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE 80,98 (Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie eds., 1984).
57 1d.
58 1d.

r
!
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guaranteed as a matter of imperial citizenship (teikoku shinmin), 59
colonial subjects only enjoyed de jure equality. To ensure
segregation of Japanese and colonial populations, the Japanese
govemment maintained separate family registries (hoseA.i) for
ethnic Japanese (naichijin-people of the interior) and for
colonized subjects (gaichijin-people of the exterior). 60 Distinct
registries ensured that colonized subjects were still marked as
"other" and filed away accordingly. 61 The family registry system
contains information about one's lineage that employers, schools,
potential spouses, and others may wish to access before making a
decision about employment, matriculation, or marriage, often for
discriminatory purposes. 62 After World War II, separate registries
facilitated the separation of ethnic Korean and Taiwanese from
ethnic Japanese, leading to their eventual denationalization. 63
In the early 1940s, as the war effort decimated the Japanese
labor force, Japan started to mobilize Koreans-usually forciblyfrom the peninsula to work in Japan. 64 The same was tme for
mainland Chinese. 65 Both Koreans and Chinese performed hard
labor in mines, factmies, and construction sites throughout the
archipelago. 66 By the time Japan smTendered in 1945, over two
million Koreans resided in Japan, 67 as did over 40,000 mainland

59

See LIE, supra note 25, at 123.

Yuji Iwasawa, Legal Treatment of Koreans in Japan: The Impact of
International Human Rights Law on Japanese Lmv, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 131, 144 (1986).
61 See id at 146.
60

See generally Taimie L. Bryant, For the Sake of the Count!)', For the Sake of the
The Oppressive Impact of Family Registration on Women and A;Iinorities in
Japan, 39 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1991) (discussing the impact of the family registration
system in Japan). The family registry helps maintain hierarchy in Japanese society by
excluding persons such as illegitimate children, burakwnin (ethnic Japanese who have
historically worked in undesirable or culturally "unclean" professions) and resident
Koreans and Taiwanese. Id Information on the family registry is used by employers,
potential spouses and schools to learn more about a person, and evaluate his or her
desirability accordingly. See id. at 111-12.
63 See Kim, supra note 38, at 51, 56.
64 See id at 55.
62

Fami~v:

65 Timothy Webster, Note, Sisyphus in a Coal Mine: Responses to Slave Labor in
Japan and the United States, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 736 (2006).
66 Kim, supra note 38, at 55.
67 !d.
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Chinese. 68 The Chinese were sent back, but at least some of the
Koreans chose to remain in Japan, as discussed in the following
section.
When it suited Japan's political aspirations, even Koreans and
Taiwanese could be legal equals to ethnic Japanese nationals, at
least as a matter oflaw. Despite formal equality, however, there is
no doubt that resident Koreans and resident Taiwanese have
enjoyed second-class treatment in Japan from the colonial period
to the present.

C. Postvvar Period (1945-1980)
After World War II, the Allied powers attempted to
democratize Japan. 69 The Potsdam Declaration proposed that,
"[t]he Japanese Govemment shall remove all obstacles to the
revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the
Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought,
as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be
established." 70 The Declaration's focus on "the Japanese people"
may have unwittingly overlooked the presence of over two million
non-Japanese who resided in the archipelago after the war, most of
them Korean. 71 In brief, the Occupation Years (1945-1952) were
foundational not only in rebuilding and transfonning Japanese
society, but also in promoting a distinctly ethnic Japanese
citizenship that rested atop the pyramid of privileges.
Japan's reorientation was complicated. The imperial power
that once sought to colonize all of East Asia tumed inward to
address problems stemming from its militaristic drift of the 1930s
and 1940s. After the war, and under intense pressure from the
American "allies," a primary item of democratization was a new
Constitution. 72 Spearheaded by the Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers ("SCAP"), and General Douglas MacArthur, many

68

Webster, supra note 65, at 736.

See Timothy Webster, Note, Legal Excisions "Omissions Are Not Accidents, 39
CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 435,440-41 (2006).
70 Potsdam Declaration: U.S.-China-Gr. Brit. ~IO, Jul. 26, 1945, available at
69

http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html.
71 See Sonia Ryang, Resident Koreans in Japan, in KOREANS IN JAPAN: CRITICAL
VOICES FROM THE MARGIN l, 3-4 (Sonia Ryang ed. 2000).

72 See Webster, supra note 69, at 435-36.
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of the initial drafters of the Japanese Constitution were young
American soldiers. 73 But Japanese politicians also played an
active role in drafting the Constihltion, and subsequently
modifying it during intemal debates. 74 As argued elsewhere, the
Japanese side played a critical role in nanowing the protective
ambit of the Constitution. 75 Though others have ably excavated
the many sessions and negotiations comprising the drafting
process/6 this section focuses on the ethnic implications of those
debates.
In the initial draft, SCAP included two provisions to
expansively protect human rights in the Japanese Constitution. 77
Both provisions were significantly nanowed by the Japanese
side. 78 One article read, "[a]ll natural persons are equal before the
law. No disc1imination shall be authorized or tolerated in
political, economic or social relations on account of race, creed,
sex or social status, caste, or national origin." 79 This is an
extraordinarily broad set of protections-far broader than those
enjoyed by Americans at the time-that would reach not only
young Americans and other foreigners residing in Japan, but also
Ainu, Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese, Okinawans, and others. 80
Over the course of negotiation and translation from English to
Japanese (and back again), the subject of the nondiscrimination
provision shrank from "all nah1ral persons" to "all people" in
English and "all citizens" in Japanese. 81 It is unclear whether
SCAP appreciated the linguistic differences between "all people"
and "all citizens," but it is clear from the historical record that the
Japanese side wanted to diminish the Constitution's protective

73

See id.

74

See id. at 442.

75 Jd.
76 See, e.g., RAYMOORE&DONALDROBINSON, PARTNERSFORDEMOCRACY(2002).
This book outlines the entire history of the Japanese constitutional drafting process,
including the "marathon session" which changed some of the language pertaining to the
rights of foreigners. See id. at 129-130.
77 Webster, supra note 69, at 443. The MacArthur Draft specifically extended
basic rights to "Japanese subjects and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction." ld.
78 Jd.
79

Id. (emphasis added).

80

See id.

81

Id. at 443-44.
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ambit and succeeded in doing so. 82 In addition, one ofthe basesnationality-was scrapped from the list of protected categories. 83
This alteration helped establish a constitutional regime that
protects Japanese citizens, but no one else, which is essentially
how the Japanese Constitution reads today.
A second provision read, "[a]liens shall be entitled to the equal
protection of law," 84 but the Japanese side questioned the
necessity of protecting aliens and decided to remove this provision
in its entirety. 85 Aliens enjoy no rights under the Japanese
Constitution. 86 While this is not necessarily different from many
other constitutions, the removal of aliens is important because the
American side intended to protect aliens, and the Japanese side
resisted this move by narrowly circumscribing legal protections. 87
The exclusion of non-Japanese was no abenation, but part of a
coordinated policy to expel ethnic others-particularly resident
Koreans-from the Japanese body politic. 88 Even before the
drafting of the Constitution, the Japanese government expressed
its views on the presence of non-Japanese in Japan. 89 A 1945
amendment to the Election Law90 nullified the right to vote, and
82
83

84

Jd. at 447-48.
Webster, supra note 69, at 444.
Jd. at 443.

85 Jd. at 444-45 (describing the process by which "all natural persons" became "all
citizens"). In addition, the Japanese side changed the protected base of "nationality" into
"family lineage," which moves the issue away from nationality, and towards class, status
and family background. I d. at 444.
86 See id. In the 1977 McLean decision, the Supreme Court of Japan detem1ined
that aliens in Japan enjoy equal constitutional rights as citizens of Japan, save for those
rights that "by their nature" should not apply to aliens (such as the right to vote, the right
to serve in political office, etc.). I d. at 449.
87 See id. at 445; see also lwasawa, supra note 60, at 146 ("Japan should not have
deprived all Koreans of their Japanese nationality unilaterally based on [their] koseki
(family registry) system, but should have referred to the nationality laws of Korea and
given to those Korean residents who wished to select Japanese nationality a chance to do
so.").
88 See Kim, supra note 38, at 56.
89 See id. The drafting began in January 1946, with the American and Japanese
side conducting their most vigorous debates in February and March 1946. I d. The Diet
debated the Constitution over the summer of 1946, before promulgating it in November
1946. Webster, supra note 69, at 441-442.
90 Election Law, Law No. 42 of 1945 (suspending the electoral eligibility of
persons not covered by the Family Registry Act).
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the right to run for office, of persons not covered by Japan's
family registry, namely resident Koreans and Taiwanese. 91 Just
months after surrender, Japan was already seeking to limit the
legal rights of ethnic minorities by prohibiting their participation
in politics. 92 Suffrage and electoral eligibility are two key
chmmels for people, including minorities, to express their voice on
national debates and to influence policy and legislation. Both
channels were severed by this amendment.
In May 1947, the Cabinet also weighed in on the debate. 93 An
Alien Registration Ordinance 94 stipulated that "in the application
of this Ordinance Taiwanese and Koreans shall be deemed, for the
time being, as aliens." 95 After disenfranchising resident Koreans
and Taiwanese, the next step was to alienate them, that is, to
subject them to alien registration procedures: annual registration,
periodic fingerprinting, and the obligation to carry one's alien
registration card at all times. 96 Most Koreans and Taiwanese
retumed to their newly independent homelands after the war, 97 yet
many remained in Japan. For several years in the late 1940s, the
number of aliens registered in Japan hovered around 640,000,
some 600,000 of whom were Korean. 98
It was only in 1952, just prior to the effectuation of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, 99 that the legal determination of resident
Koreans and Taiwanese took final fonn. 100 In April, the Ministry
of Justice issued a circular, stripping all ethnic Koreans and
Taiwanese of their Japanese nationality. 101 One way to interpret
these events is to suggest that since Japan no longer maintained
control over Korean and Taiwanese territory, why should its

91
92

93

94
95

Kim, supra note 38, at 56.
See id.
See id.
Alien Registration Ordinance, Order No. 207 of 1947, Art. II.
!d.

See id. at 58-59.
See id. at 55.
98 !d. at 57.
96
97

99 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951,3 U.S.T. 3!69. The Treaty went into
effect on April28, 1952.
100 See Iwasawa, supra note 60, at 144.
101 See id.
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government bestow the benefits of citizenship on people who
came therefrom? To be sure, resident Korean and Taiwanese
residents of Japan could have naturalized through standard
Japanese immigration processes, but they would have had to shed
their original name, take on a Japanese name, and submit their
applications to the discretionary selection processes of the
Ministry of Justice. 102 As a matter of law, resident Koreans and
Taiwanese were hencefmih aliens, subject to a new legal
103
framework, including the hmnigration Control Act and Alien
104
Registration Ordinance.
The Alien Registration Law imposed numerous restrictions on
the Korean and Taiwanese minorities. 105 For instance, they had to
register as aliens, renew their registration every three years, carry
their registration card at all times, and present it when requested
by a police officer. 106 When renewing their registration, resident
Koreans and Taiwanese had to be fingerprinted, which many
considered offensive given the criminal connotations of
fingerprinting. 107 They were excluded from social welfare
108
and they were
programs that require Japanese nationality,
denied the opportunity to work in many civil service positions that
involve the "exercise of public authority or the formation of public
will." 109 Such a constraint may seem appropriate for positions
where exercise of state sovereignty is implicated, such as
110
diplomatic service, or service as prime minister,
but this

102
103

See Kim, supra note 38, at 65.
See id. at 57-58 (discussing the Immigration Control Act, Cabinet Order No. 319

of1951).
104 The Alien Registration Law was promulgated on the same day that the Peace
Treaty took effect: April 28, 1952. Id. Law No. 125 of 1952. The message from the
Japanese government was clear: having lost the former colonies by virtue of the Peace
Treaty, we hereby renounce any responsibility to the people we colonized. See Kim,

supra note 38, at 58.
105 See Kim, supra note 3 8, at 61.
106
107
108

Id.
See Bryant, supra note 62, at 126.
Kim, supra note 38, at 61.

Id.
Only one Japanese law specifically requires citizenship for employment: the
Diplomat Law. Temki Tsunemoto, Rights & Identities of Ethnic Minorities in Japan:
Indigenous Ainu and Resident Koreans, 2 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 119, 137 (2001).
Yet the government maintains that citizenship is necessary for positions where one
109

110
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regulation also prohibits resident Koreans and Taiwanese from
teaching in public schools, delivering the mail, and working as
nurses in public hospitals. 111 In a controversial 2005 decision, the
Supreme Court of Japan upheld a Tokyo ordinance that prevented
a resident Korean nurse from working in a public hospital. 112
Policies from half a century ago continue to be relevant in the
present. As we shall see in the next part, resident Koreans have
mounted a host of legal challenges to various aspects of the legal
framework governing permanent aliens, with varying degrees of
success. 113 In these suits, international human rights law provides
essential legal and normative bases for their claims. 114

D. Contemporary Japan (1980 to present)
By 1992, 1.3 million registered foreigners lived in Japan, about
one percent of the total Japanese population. 115 About 35% of
these were so-called special permanent residents, mainly Koreans
(and some Chinese), mostly descended from the migrants who
entered Japan during the colonial period from 1895-1945. 116
One of the most explicitly racialized policies of recent vintage
is the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act. 117 In the 1980s, as Japan became the second
largest economy in the world, migrants from Asia flocked to Japan

exercises public authority or participates in formulating policy. ld at 137-38.
111 Kim, supra note 38, at 61.
112 Webster, supra note 69, at 451-53. Thirteen of fifteen Justices agreed that
Tokyo had a "rational basis" to distinguish foreigners from citizens in appointing local
civil servants. ld. at 453. The Tokyo District Court agreed with this ruling, finding that
"the Constitution does not guarantee foreigners the right to employment as a civil
servant." !d. at 452. The Tokyo High Court reversed, holding that employing foreigners
in certain civil service positions would not infringe upon national sovereignty, but the
Supreme Court overturned the appellate court's ruling by discerning a rational basis in
the city policy. Jd. at 453.
113 YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW 150
( 1998).
114 ld.
115 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of
1951, translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku!houreildata/icrra.pdf.
116 ld.
117 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of
1951, translation available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku!hourei/data/icrra.pdf.
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to perform unskilled labor, often illegally. 118 Higher up the value
chain, skilled workers were needed to supply Japan with the talent
necessary to compete globally. 119 The immigration law was
revised to respond to these fluctuations, responding in three main
ways. First, the law broadened the scope of legal employment in
which certain skilled and professional foreigners could engage. 120
Second, it introduced penalties against employers that illegally
employed foreign workers, and against brokers that found jobs for
them. 121 Third, it pennitted descendants of overseas Japaneseprimarily in Brazil and Peru-to work in Japan with no job
restrictions, for up to three years. 122 In effect, this opened up the
unskilled labor market to the Japanese diaspora and closed it to the
South Asians, East Asians, Southeast Asians, and others who had
been working in Japan during the 1980s. 123 The Japanese
govemment accepted almost 200,000 ethnically Japanese workers
and effectively excluded all other unskilled laborers. 124
Though etlmically Japanese, most Japanese-Brazilians and
Japanese-Peruvians experience a completely different language,
culture and society upon touching down in Japan. Nevertheless,
their presence in Japan highlights official concem with
maintaining ethnic homogeneity in the face of cultural diversity. 125
It is unlikely that many Japanese citizens would actually encounter
Japanese Latinos, who are normally concentrated in company
housing and bused to their jobs through company transportation. 126
The Japanese physiognomies sought by the national govemment
remain largely invisible to the populace.
A final note touches on Japan's refugee policy. It would be
ll8 Yoko Sellek, Nikkeijin: The Phenomenon of Return Migration, in JAPAN's
MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 178, 182-83 (Michael Weiner ed., 1997).
ll9

See id. at 183-84.

12 0

ld. at 183.

121 ld. at 183-84; see also Timothy Webster, Reconstituting Japanese Law:
International Norms and Domestic Litigation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 214 (2008)

(discussing the creation of penalties for employers hiring illegal workers and for
individuals who help employers find illegal labor).
12

Webster, supra note 121, at 214-15.

124

See id. at 215.
Sellek, supra note 118, at 202.
See id.

2
123

125
126

See id. at 200.
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unfair to evaluate a country's openness to ethnic others solely by
looking at its treatment of refugees. But refugee policy can reflect
attitudes towards foreigners and international commitments to
provide for stateless people. In this respect, Japan has gone from a
policy of refusing asylum-seekers for the first part of the postwar
period (1945 to 1978), to one of grudging acceptance of a small
number of refugees since it ratified the Refugee Convention in
1981. 127
Criticism of the tightly circumscribed nature of Japan's
refugee regime has been widespread. 128 Even after ratifying the
Refugee Convention, Japan has been loath to accept asylumseekers; in each year from 1989 to 1997, the number of
acceptances never exceeded single-digits. 129 From 1998 to 2004,
acceptances averaged around twenty per year. 130 And while
numbers have increased slightly since then, it is fair to conclude
that Japan has not been a major destination country for refugees.
With this slight uptick in acceptances, however, has also been an
increased willingness by comis to appeal decisions rendered by
the Ministry of Justice, and grant asylum. l3l This will be more
fully explored in the next section.

127 See RYUJI !vlUKAE, JAPAN'S REFUGEE POLICY: To BE OF THE WORLD 137-38, 14950 (200 1).
128 See, e.g., 0SAMU ARAKAIU, REFUGEE LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 233 (2008)
("Japan's refugee determination system conflicts with any reasonable understanding of
the notions of fair decision-makers and fair procedure. Under the present Japanese
determination system, it is difficult to believe that accurate and fair decisions can be
assured."); Akashi Junichi, Challenging Japan's Refugee Policies, 15 ASIAN & PAC.
MIGRATION J. 219, 221 (2006) ("Many existing studies and commentaries on Japan's
refugee policy are inclined to take a critical attitude toward Japanese society or
government for falling short of complying with international humanitarian regimes.");
MUT<AE, supra note 127, at 242 ("In a nutshell, Japan's isolationist asylum (and more
generally immigration) policy has been construed and in fact used in order to defend
Japan's putative national cultural/etlmic pmity and hence its economic prosperity and
public safety. Obviously, Japan, as a major economic power, cannot get away with
keeping such an exclusionist attitude in this increasingly interdependent world.").
129

ARAI<AKI, supra note 128, at 27; Junichi, supra note 128, at 219.

See ARAI<AIU, supra note 128, at 27.
Iwasawa Yftji, Nihonni okeru Ko!atsai Nanminh6 no Kaishaku Tekiy6 [The
Inte1pretation and Application of International Reji1gee Law in Japan], 1321 JURISUTO
16, 18 (2006).
!30
131
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II. Cases: Litigation Challenges Disparate or Unfair
Treatment
We have examined how over time the Japanese state has
promoted the interests of ethnic Japanese over those of various
minority groups. Given the demographic dominance of ethnic
Japanese citizens in Japan, minorities encounter serious obstacles
in protecting themselves through political processes. 132 A group
numbering in the tens of thousands (like the Ainu), or even in the
hundreds of thousands (like resident Koreans), does not count for
much in a country with 125 million people. 133 Moreover,
pennanent residents and temporary residents ca1111ot vote in
national elections and in most local elections, eliminating one
common cham1el to voice grievances. 134
Lawsuits, on the other hand, offer one way through which
dispossessed minorities can challenge laws that inure to their
detriment. Since the laws in many cases do not provide for causes
of action, minority plaintiffs often cite international human rights
law to lend additional moral, legal, or nonnative weight to their
claims. 135 Several kinds of cases illuminate the ways that
international law has served to challenge the Japanese ethno-state.
This section focuses on three cases that conespond to the general

132 With a population of less than 2%, only a fraction of which are citizens of Japan
(and hence voters in national elections), minorities have a difficult time availing
themselves of political processes. See Registered foreign population in Japan hits
record-high 2.21 million, JAPAN TODAY, July 11, 2009,

http://www.japantoday.com/category/nationallview/registered-foreign-population-injapan-hits-record-high-221-million.
133 John Lie, relying on Japanese sources, puts the number of Ainu at 24,000,
though the number of people with Ainu ancestry could easily exceed that number by a
factor of ten. JoHN LIE, supra note 25, at 94. The Economist fixes the number of
resident Koreans at 406,000. See A foreigner in her own home: Shoddy treatment of its
Korea residents once again deals Japan a black eye, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18338862.

!34 See Miles J. Hawks, Translation and Comment, Granting Permanent Resident
Aliens the Right to Vote in Local Government: T11e New Komeito Continues to Promote
Alien Suffi·age in Japan, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 369, 370-71 (2007)(noting that only
Japanese citizens can vote in national elections, but local governments are currently
considering provisions to allow permanent residents the right to vote).
135 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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types of minorities in contemporary Japan. 136 The first type of
case concerns Japan's Ainu population by analyzing an important
decision from 1997, showing how international human rights law
expanded the scope of applicable law and led judges to hold an
administrative taking illegal under domestic and international law.
The second type of case involves a cluster of challenges brought
by resident Koreans to two of Japan's policies on resident aliens:
the fingerprinting regime and the refusal to grant various forms of
welfare. 137 The third type of case addresses the absence of
domestic protections for discrimination in the private sphere,
rather than any particular enacted law or policy. While it may
seem unfair to focus on the absence of law, I argue that this lacuna
is significant as the result of the Diet's failure to pass protective
legislation.

A. Ainu
The Ainu people represent a tiny subpopulation within Japan.
By one estimate, approximately 24,000 Japanese self-identify as
Ainu, though many more can trace their lineage back to Ainu
ancest1y. 138 As with indigenous populations in other countries, 139
the Ainu face various socioeconomic challenges in their
encounters with mainstream society: they are twice as likely to
receive welfare as the average Japanese citizen, yet less than half

136 This typology is modified slightly from David L. Howell, Ethnicity and Culture
in Contempora/y Japan, in 1 RACE, ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION IN MODERN JAPAN 103
(Michael Weiner ed., 2004). Howell divides Japan's minorities into native minorities
(Ainu, Olcinawans, and Buralcumin), Koreans brought to Japan during World War II and
their descendants, and recent immigrants from Asia and Latin America. !d. at 104. This
article narrows the focus of the first category to examine only one group of natives: the
Ainu people. I do this because of the long period of acculturation policy that the
Japanese state directed at the Ainu, and because, so far as I can tell, Okinawans and
Burakumin have not used international human 1ights law to bolster their legal claims.
Conversely, this article expands the focus of category three to include other recent
immigrants from the United States and Europe.
137 See infra, Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
138 Tsunemoto, supra note 110, at 120.
139 For example, only eighteen percent of Native Americans aged eighteen to
twenty-four enroll in college, while forty-two percent of whites aged eighteen to twentyfour enroll in college. Michelle J. Nealy, Chronicling the Lives of Native Americans on
Predominantly White Campuses, DrvERSE: ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Mar. 4, 2009),
http:/I diverseeducation. com/article/12362/.

2011]

INSULAR MINORITIES

577

as likely to attend university. 140 Since the 1980s, as indigenous
rights movements have sprung up in other areas of the globe, the
Ainu too have launched a movement to establish their ethnic
identity and secure certain indigenous rights. 141
The minority status of the Ainu in Japan has been contested
since at least 1980, when Japan, in its first periodic report to the
U.N. Human Rights Cmmnittee, stated that the Japanese
Constitution supports "[t]he right of any person to enjoy his own
culture, to profess and practice his own religion or to use his own
language .... However, minorities of the kind mentioned in the
Covenant do not exist in Japan." 142 This statement reflects an
official view of etlmic differences in Japan, or rather their absence,
while providing an important starting point for official discussions
about the recognition of minority culture. In a later periodic
repmi, the Japanese government aclmowledged that under Article
27 of the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), 143 the Ainu constituted a minority, 144 yet the
government has been unwilling to officially recognize the Ainu as
an indigenous minority. 145 This is perhaps out of fear that such
recognition would validate, and possibly increase, claims for selfdetermination by the Ainu.
A degree of self-detennination was at the hemi of a lawsuit

140
141

See Tsunemoto, supra note 110, at 121.
Jd. at 121-22.

142 United Nations Human Rights Committee [hereinafter UNHRC], Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports
of States Parties Due in 1980 (Japan), 12th Sess., Oct. 24, 1980, art. 27, UN Doc.
CCPRJC/10/Add. 1 (Nov. 14, 1980).
143 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR].
144 UNCHR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties In
Accordance with Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Reports of States Parties
Due in 1991 (Japan), Dec.l6, 1991, ~ 233, UN Doc. CCPRJC/70/Add. 1 (March 30,
1992).
145 See UNHCR, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee
(Japan), 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, ~ 32, U.N. Doc. CCPRJC/JPN/C0/5 (Dec. 18,
2008) ("The State party should expressly recognize the Ainu and Ryukyu/Okinawa as
indigenous peoples in domestic legislation, adopt special measures to protect, preserve
and promote their cultural heritage and traditional way of life, and recognize their land
rights.").
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filed in 1993 by two members of the Ainu minority. 146 The pair
sued a Japanese administrative agency for approving a dam that
eventually flooded lands sacred to the Ainu. 147 In a strongly
worded 1997 decision, the Sapporo District Court found the
Minister of Constmction, who was ultimately responsible for the
approval, had not sufficiently investigated the case and had failed
to understand the harm done to the Ainu. 148 But since the dam had
already flooded the religious site, and would require great expense
to remove, the court deployed the "public welfare" exception to
conclude that the dam could remain where it was. 149
In concluding that the Ainu were an ethnic minority deserving
of protection, the court relied heavily on international law,
primarily the ICCPR, but also the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") Convention on Indigenous People. 150 The
judgment recognized that the Ainu were an ethnic minority under
the ICCPR. 151 Moreover, the Ainu constituted an "indigenous
people" that retained a unique culture and identity, "even after
suffering enorn1ous social and economic devastation wrought by
policies adopted by the [ethnic Japanese] majority. " 152 In light of
the comments made to the Human Rights Committee a decade
before, this recognition represents real progress.
Plaintiffs cited Article 27 of the ICCPR, which provides that
minorities "shall not be denied the right ... to enjoy their own
culh1re." 153 Though this provision imposes a negative obligation
upon member states (not to deny the right), the Japanese court
found "a positive obligation" 154 upon Japan to "exercise due

146
147
148
149

Levin, supra note 41, at 399-400.
Jd.

Jd. at 398-99, 403.
Id. at 429.

150 E.g., International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention, opened for signature June 27, 1989,28 LL.M. 1384 (entered into force Sept.
5, 1991); Levin, supra note 41, at 418; International Labour Organization, Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples Convention, opened for signature June 27, 1989, 28 LL.M. 1384
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991 ).
151 Levin, supra note 41, at 418.
!52 Id. at 422.

ICCPR, supra note 143, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
Tokushiro Ohata & Takahide Nagata, Illegality of the Expropriation of Ainu
Land in View of Their Rights As an Indigenous People, 18 WASEDA BULL. CaMP. L. 99,
153

154
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care ... when deciding upon, or executing, national policies that
155
risk adversely affecting a minority's culture." This amounts to a
fairly robust reading of Article 27, which is otherwise plu·ased
quite passively. In no uncertain ten11s, the court held that the
Japanese Ministry of Culture failed to exercise due care 111
156
reviewing matetials that authorized the dam. The Minister
"neglected the investigative and research procedures that
were necessary to judge the priority of the competing
interests; . . . umeasonably made little of and ignored
various factors and values that should have been given the
highest regard; [and] . . . recognized only the smallest
possible impact on Ainu culture and left any damages
157
thereupon umemedied."
While decrying the Minister's neglect, the comi did not offer
compensation for the authorization, and indeed permitted the dam
to reach completion. 158 Still, in cataloguing the various misdeeds
of the Minister, and importing various notions about the rights of
indigenous people, the court fulfilled international legal
obligations to protect human rights. One can tightly dispute the
nature of the remedy ordered-essentially a slap on the wrist of
the Ministry-but the influence of international law in judicial
reasoning was impressive and still relatively scarce, up until that
159
point, in Japanese jurisprudence.

103 (1997) (Japan).
155 Levin, supra note 41, at 418.
156
157
158

I d. at 427.
Jd.

ld. at 429.
See generally Timothy Webster, international Human Rights Law In Japan: The
~iew at Thirty, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 241, 243 (2010) (describing the Japanese
JUdiciary's awakening to the international human rights law in the 1990s).
159
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B. Ethnic and Racial Discrimination 160 Lawsuits
In a stiing of racial discrimination lawsuits brought in the past
decade, courts have had ample opportunity to use intemational
human rights law to correct domestic law, or more accurately, to
correct the absence of domestic law. 161 In 2003, the Japanese Diet
debated, but failed to pass, a human rights protection bill that
would make illegal much of the conduct at issue in these cases,
such as discrimination by real estate agents, shopkeepers, bar
owners, and providers of services. 162 It has been subsequently
resubmitted, but failed to find the necessary political support
among members of the Diet. 163 For the time being, victims of
racial and ethnic discrimination will have to look beyond Japan's
domestic legislation, and the political processes that create it, to
fashion their arguments.
The issue of racial discrimination in the private sphere is not
new in Japan.
Resident Koreans challenged employment
discrimination in the 1970s 164 and housing discrimination in the

160 The differences between race and etlmicity are complex and beyond the scope of
this inquiry. For purposes of this paper, cases of etlmic discrimination refer to lawsuits
brought by resident Koreans, etlmic Chinese, or other East Asians whose physical
appearance would not permit immediate differentiation from the "typical" Japanese
physiognomy. Cases of racial discrimination refer to cases brought by whites, AfricanAmericans, Latinos, South Asians, and others whose physical appearance is
distinguishable from the typical Japanese.
161 See Timothy Webster, Reconstructing Japanese Law: International Norms and
Domestic Legislation, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 211, 245 (2008) (describing the absence of
Japanese law on racial discrimination).
162 !d. at 247.
Certain forms of discriminatory behavior, such as differential
treatment in wages and working conditions, were proscribed by the Labor Standards Act.
See Labor Standards Act, Law No. 49 of 1947, arts. 3, 4 (Japan). But this act does not
address discrimination in hiring, nor discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,
or ethnicity. See id.
163 See Webster, supra note 161, at 248 (stating the human rights protection bill was
resubmitted in 2005). With the change of political power in September 2009, it is
conceivable that the more liberal Democratic Party of Japan may resubmit the bill. See
Japan NGO Network for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, NGOs
Answers to the Questions by the Rapporteur in Connection with the Consideration of the
Third to Sixth Periodic Reports of Japan (CERD/C/JPN/3-6), 17 (Feb. 3, 201 0) available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/cerd/docs/ngos/SNMJ_Answers _Japan _76.doc.
164 See Pak Chong-sok v. Hitachi, 744 HANREI Jm6 29 (Yokohama Dist. Ct., June
19, 1974).
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165

1980s.
However, a 1998 decision rendered by the Shizuoka
District Court has reinvigorated racial discrimination lawsuits. 166
In this case, a Japanese owner of a jewelry store expelled a
Brazilian woman from his store because she was a foreigner,
which she believed was an illegal violation of her human rights. 167
The court agreed with her claim, ordered compensation for the
plaintiff, and relied heavily on the International Convention to End
All Forms ofRacial Discrimination ("CERD") in so doing. 168 This
set an important, although unbinding precedent for future victims
of racial discrimination in the private sphere.
In his judgment, Judge Soh Tetsuro fashioned a tort remedy
out of international and constitutional law. 169 He did not
specifically examine the issue of whether CERD had direct or
indirect effect, but simply noted that, "CERD is beneath the
Constitution, but still has effect in this country as domestic law." 170
In his analysis, Judge Soh focused on a comment made by the
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the CERD Committee that
Japan did not need to take "[n]ew legislative measures ... to
effectuate this treaty." 171 The official posited that Japan's existing
legal system could handle racial discrimination in the private
sphere without implementing additional legislation. 172 The judge
disagreed, asking rhetorically, "do we dare think that legislative
measures and budgetary measures will not be necessary [to
adequately safeguard these rights]?" 173 By and large, Japanese
judges defer to the decisions and statements of the political
174
branches, so this amounted to a fairly strong judicial rebuke
both to the executive (for its statement) and to the legislature (for

165

See Pe v. Kitaura, 1468 HANREJ JIH6 122 (Osaka Dist. Ct., June 18, 1993).

Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAJMUZU 216 (Shizuoka Dist. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999),
translated in Timothy Webster, Bortz v. Suzuzki, Judgment of October 12, 1999,
Hamamatsu Branch, Shizuoka District Court, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL 'y J. 631 (2007).
167 Webster, supra note 166, at 631-32.
168 1d.
166

169

1d.

170

1d. at 651.

171

1d. at 651 (alteration in original).
Webster, supra note 166, at 631-32.
1d. at 652 (emphasis added).
See Webster, supra note 161, at 260.

172
173
174

h
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failing to pass a racial discrimination law). Indeed, the nature and
discursiveness of this opinion suggest that the judge aimed to send
a message. 175 CERD urges states to pass laws banning racial
discrimination by private persons, 176 and if the state fails to do so,
it states that courts are the appropriate venue to handle the
dispute. 177 As the verdict states,
CERD goes one step farther [than the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights] by requiring signatories to
take legislative and other measures to deal with individual
and group acts of racial discrimination.
This means that if an act of racial discrimination
violated a provision of CERD, and the state or organization
did not take the measures that it should have, then one
could, in accordance with Article 6 of CERD, at the very
least seek compensation for damages, or take other
measures for relief, against the state or organization due to
the omission. 178
Article 6 of CERD guarantees victims of racial discrimination
"effective protection and remedies, through the competent national
tribunals." 179
If Japan does not pass laws to proscribe
discriminatory conduct, either nationally or locally, 180 this absence
cannot inoculate racist behavior.
To fill the gap in legislation, Judge Soh used CERD's
prohibition on racial discrimination by third pmiies 181 as an
interpretive aid (or "interpretive standard" 182 in Japanese parlance)
175 The opinion is also noteworthy for its didactic introduction to the history of
human rights, from Confucius and Mencius to Martin Luther and World War II. See
Webster, supra note 166, at 652-53, 656. Needless to say, such a historical introduction
would be rare in most jurisdictions.
176 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 2(l)(d), Dec. 21, 1965,660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD] (stating
that "Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means,
including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons,
group or organization.").
177 /d. art. 6.
178
179

Webster, supra note 166, at 652.
CERD, supra note 176, art. 6.

To this day, Japan has not passed a law proscribing discriminatory conduct at
either national or local levels. See Webster, supra note 161, at 250.
181 CERD, supra note 176, art. 2(1)(d).
182 Webster, supra note 166, at 652.
180

"

I
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to detennine that the storeowner's expulsion was illegal. 183 By
denying plaintiff access to services held out to the general public,
the storeowner celiainly violated Article 5(f) of CERD, 184 even if
no domestic law was violated. In so doing, Judge Soh seems to
have applied Article 6 of CERD, which empowers national
tribunals to adjudicate disputes and award compensation. 185 By
awarding damages and finding an illegal act-the tort of racial
discrimination-Judge Soh provides both process and
compensation for the dispute. 186 To reiterate, the opinion does not
say it is directly applying CERD, but seems to achieve as much by
finding liability and ordering compensation anyway.
Many subsequent cases also applied CERD in this way.
Japanese comis apply intemational human rights law between
private citizens by citing to CERD as an "interpretative
standard." 187 Several coulis have held that private acts of racial
discrimination (rejecting people from public places, golf clubs,
stores, house rentals, and bars) are "illegal," and have ordered
compensation accordingly, even in the absence of directly
applicable domestic law. 188 This "personalization" of intemational
law suggests that intemational human rights law can meaningfully
gap-fill in Japan's umegulated private sector and may even be able
to influence private persons' behavior. 189
Over the years, coulis have taken a relatively unified stance in
applying CERD to private paliies, reading intemational law
through the language of domestic toli law. 190 The Sapporo District
Comi spelled out this process a bit more elaborately:
Article 14(1) of the Constitution, the ICCPR, and CERD
183 Jd. at 631-32.
184 CERD, supra note 176, art. 5(f). CERD guarantees "right of access to any place
or service intended for use by the general public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants,
cafes, theatres and parks." Jd. (emphasis added).
185 Jd. art. 6.
186 Webster, supra note 166, at 631-32.
187 Arudouv.Earth Cure,ll50 HANRE1TAIMUZU185(Sapporo D. Ct.,Nov.11,
2002), translated in Timothy Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure: Judgment of November
11, 2002, Sapporo District Court, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & PoL'Y J. 297, 298 & n.5 (2008).
188 See generally Webster, supra note 159 (outlining how Japanese comis have
turned to international human rights law to address racial discrimination).
189 Jd. at 260.
190 Jd. at 260-61.
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do not apply directly to relations between private persons.
But if private conduct specifically violates, or risks
violating, another person's basic rights or equality, these
provisions can be used to evaluate social norms. Articles 1
and 90 of the Civil Code, 191 among others, generally
regulate private autonomy, and protect an individual's
interests against illegal infringements of basic rights and
equality. Thus, Article 14(1) of the Constitution, the
ICCPR, and CERD can serve as one standard in
inte1preting the above provisions of private law. 192
Cases such as these suggest that international law-even when
not accompanied by relevant domestic law-can advance human
rights in important areas that domestic law, and the political
process, may leave untouched.

C. Resident Koreans
The third type of case involves Japan's resident Korean
population, which has comprised its largest ethnic minority
presence for most of the postwar period. 193 At present, some
600,000 resident Koreans live in Japan, most of them descended
from those who immigrated to Japan during the colonial period. 194
They do not possess Japanese citizenship, which in tum subjects
them to various forms of discrimination by state and private
actors. 195 In light of the weak protections offered by domestic law,
resident Koreans often tum to international human 1ights law to
protect their rights. 196

191 Article 1 of the Civil Code requires that rights and obligations shall be
performed "in good faith." MINP6 [Crv. C.], ati. 1 (Japan). Article 90 proscribes acts
that are "against public policy." !d. art. 90. The latter provision is commonly used in
cases where a person discriminates against another, for example, on the basis of gender.
See Hidenori Tomatsu, Equal Protection of the Law, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,
114 (1990).

1n Webster, supra note 159, at 317 (emphasis added). The court went on to note
that Yunohana's conduct amounted to "discrimination based on race, skin color, descent,
ethnic origin or racial migin. In light of the meaning of Aliicle 14(1) of the Constitution,
Article 26 of the ICCPR, and CERD, these amount to private acts of racial
discrimination that ought to be eliminated." !d. at 317-18.
193
194
195
196

IWASAWA, supra note 113, 123.
Id. at 123-25.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 123-24.
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Two clusters of cases in particular have cited numerous
intemational human rights instruments: those challenging Japan's
restrictive residency requirements and those challenging exclusive
pension laws. First, for several decades, resident Koreans had to
be fingerprinted whenever they renewed their alien registration
cards or retumed to Japan after traveling abroad. 197 Through a
series of lawsuits in the 1980s and early 1990s, resident Koreans
challenged the necessity and legality of the fingerprinting regime,
which was ultimately repealed in 1993. 198 Many of their
challenges were based on the prohibition on degrading treatment
found in the ICCPR. 199 Second, resident Koreans have routinely
cited international human rights law to prod the Japanese
government to provide them with pensions?00 Japan significantly
revised its pension laws in the early 1980s, after ratifying the
Refugee Convention, 201 but many resident Koreans were still
excluded from disability pensions, military pensions and old age
pensions due to loopholes in the revised pension system. 202 They
have appealed to the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights\ ("ICESCR") 203 in order to protect the right to
social insurance. 204
I. Finge1printing

After denationalization in 1952, resident Koreans and
Taiwanese became aliens in Japan, and henceforth subject to its
Alien Registration Law. 205 Under this system, they had to have
their fingerprints taken on a registration card, a registration
certificate, and a fingerprint card, once every five years. 206

197

Jd. at 150.

198 lWASAWA,
199

Jd. at 151.

200
201

Jd. at 171.
Jd.

202

Id. at 172.

supra note 113, 151 & n.102.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], available at
http :I/www2. ohchr. org/English/law/cescr .htm.
204 lWASAWA, supra note 113, 172-73.
2 05 Jd. at 150.
2 06 Jd. at 150.
203
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Refusal to submit to this requirement could lead to up to one year
of imprisonment, or a fine of up to 200,000 yen. 207 Needless to
say, a similar requirement was not imposed on Japanese
nationals. 208 The fingerprinting regime was gradually loosened
over the course of the 1980s, and ultimately abolished in 1993. 209
While this abolition came as the result of various political factors,
including official negotiations between Japan and Korea, 210 a
series of lawsuits in the 1980s and 1990s added pressure and
visibility to the cause. 211
For many aliens, the fingerprinting requirement was
objectionable because of its associations with the criminal process;
in Japan, as in many other countries, criminals are fingerprinted
upon atTest. Begitming in the 1980s, resident Koreans refused to
be fingerprinted upon renewing their registration fonns or
reentering Japan after traveling abroad. 212 In 1985, some 360,000
aliens renewed their registrations, but over 10,000 refused to be
fingerprinted. 213
In addition to these large-scale protests, a number of resident
Koreans also launched legal challenges to the fingerprinting
regime, relying heavily on international law. 214 In an early case,
the Tokyo District Comi claimed that "to compel fingerprinting
without just cause or need" could indeed amount to '"degrading
treatment' stipulated in Article 7 of the ICCPR."215 But since there
was a reasonable basis for the fingerprinting system-to wit
"clarifying the residential and family relations of resident
foreigners"-the court did not find a violation of international
law.216
207
208

Jd.
Jd.

209

lWASAWA, supra note 113, 154-56.

210

ld. at 155.

211 Iwasawa lists half a dozen lawsuits, two of which went as far as the Supreme
Court. Id. at 151, n.1 02.
213

Jd. at 150.
Id. at 150.

214

lWASAWA, supra note 113, at 151.

212

215 See, e.g., State of Japan v. Han Jong-seok, Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist.
Ct.], Nov. 29, 1984, 1125 HANREI TAIMUZU 101, 29 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 238, 240
(1986).

216

Id. at 245.
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In another lawsuit filed in 1989, plaintiff Yun Chang-yol
claimed that the fingerprinting system violated his constitutional
rights, as well as Articles 7 (degrading treatment) and 26 (nondiscrimination) of the ICCPR. 217 The Osaka High Court found the
fingerprinting system constitutional, even though the Diet had
abolished the system two years earlier. 218 Under international law,
219
however, the comi anived at a different conclusion.
The
international law claims pushed the comi to examine a significant
amount of foreign jurispmdence, including the Tyrer decision
from the European Court of Human Rights, 220 the East African
221
Asian cases of the European Commission of Human Rights, and
various views and General Comments of the Human Rights
Committee. 222 These materials proved helpful to the Japanese
comi's conception of "degrading treatment." 223 In pmiicular, the
foreign material instmcted the court that degrading treatment
involved a certain amount of humiliation beyond that nonnally felt
224
from criminal conviction, yet below that felt from torture. In the
end, the court decided that the fingerprinting system did not rise to
the level of "degrading treatment" as proscribed by Article 7 of the
ICCPR, though it did caution that "special considerations" were
225
necessary when analyzing the treatment of resident aliens."
Concerning the discrimination claim of Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the court found that there was "room to suspect" that it
was umeasonable to treat resident aliens differently from Japanese
226
citizens as mandated by the fingerprinting system.
While not a

217 Yun Chang-yo! v. Japan & Kyoto, Osaka Koto Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.], Oct.
28,1994,1513 HANREIJIHO 1513,38 JAPANESEANN.lNT'LL. 118, 118 (1995); ICCPR,
supra note 143, at 26, aJi. 7.

219

Jd. at 129-33.
Jd.

220

Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1978).

218

East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4403/70, 78-A Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. (1973).
222 Office of the High Commissioner, UNHCR, CCPR General Comment No. 15:
The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, 11 April 1986, available at
http://www .unhcr.org/refwor1d/docid/45139acfc.html.
221

224

ICCPR, supra note 143, aJi. 7.
Yun Chang-yo!, 38 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. at 130 (emphasis added).

225

Jd.

223
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strong condemnation of the fingerprinting policy, reference to
international law permitted the court to suggest that a particular
policy may have been illegal. 227 The court was clear that neither
the ICCPR nor the Constitution was violated, yet the ICCPR
provided some cover for the court to question the legality and
sagacity of the fingerprinting system as applied to resident
aliens. 228

2. Pension Rights
One common feature of citizenship, in Japan and elsewhere, is
the right to access social welfare programs, including pensions. In
1952, when all resident Koreans were stripped of their Japanese
citizenship, they also lost the right to access pensions, national
health insurance, and other entitlements of the welfare state. 229
Though some Japanese municipalities made health insurance
available on a local level, not all resident Koreans lived in such
areas. 230 Not until 1986 were all resident Koreans guaranteed
national health insurance. 231
In 1982, upon acceding to the Refugee Convention, Japan
revised its laws to nullify the nationality requirements for
pensions. 232 However, the revisions still excluded many resident
aliens. 233 Resident aliens over the age of thirty-five in 1982 were
effectively barred because they were unable to make twenty-five
years of payments by the time they would qualify for old age
pensions at age sixty. 234 Though an interim measure was later
passed to cover these people, others remained ineligible for
pensions, even to this day. 235 For example, persons over sixty

226 Jd. at 132. The comi also held that "it cannot be denied that doubts are raised,
with respect to [resident aliens] ... that may give rise to a situation violating Article 13
and 14 o the Constitution and Article 7 and 26 of the Covenant." Jd. at 132-133.
227 Jd. at 129-131.
228

Jd. at 132.

229

Yun Chang-yo!, 38

230
231

See
Jd.

232

Jd.

233

Jd.

234

Jd. at 172.

235

See

IWASAWA,

IWASAWA,

JAPANESE

ANN.

INT'LL.

supra note 113, at 170.

supra note 113, at 170.

at 130 (emphasis added).
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years of age in 1986 cannot receive old age pensions, while
persons over twenty years of age in 1982 cannot receive disability
pensions. 236
Faced with such loopholes, many resident Koreans have turned
to Japanese courts, and to international law, to challenge their
exclusion from Japan's pensions programs. 237 In particular, the
ICESCR guarantees "the right of everyone to social security,
including social insurance." 238 Even so, disputes concerning
disability pensions, 239 old age pensions/40 and military pensions 241
have generally not favored plaintiffs. Courts wriggle out of the
very clear language of the ICESCR by claiming the treaty lacks
direct effect; in the words of the ICESCR, its obligations are to be
"achieved progressively." 242 In these cases, 243 Japanese courts

237

ld.
ld.

238

ICESCR, supra note 203, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.

236

Shiomi v. Governor of Osaka, 31 GY6SAISHU 216 (Osaka Dist. Ct. Oct. 29,
1980), ajf'd 35 GY6SAJSH0 2220 (Osaka High Ct., Dec. 19, 1984), ajf'd 1363 HANREJ
HH6 68 (S. Ct., Mar. 2, 1989).
239

240 Hyon Sun 1m v. Governor of Kyoto, 1993 HANREl JIH6 104 (Kyoto Dist. Ct.,
Feb. 23, 2007).
241 Kang Bu Jung v. Governor of Osaka, 1718 HANREI
15, 1999);

JIH6

30 (Osaka H. Ct., Oct.

242 ICESCR, supra note 203, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. They arrive at this
conclusion by reading one particular provision of the ICESCR, which obligates State
Parties to "take steps ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
right recognized [herein]." ld.
243 See, e.g., Shiomi v. Governor of Osaka, 1363 HANREI JIH6 68 (S. Ct., Mar. 2,
1989), ajf'ing 35 GY6SA1SHU 2220 (Osaka High Ct., Dec. 19, 1984), ajf'ing 31
GY6SAJSHU 216 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Oct 29, 1980), ajf'd. Shiomi first applied for a
pension in 1972, but was rejected. IWASAWA, supra note 113, at 172. She sued the
Governor of Osaka in 1973, but the Osaka District Court dismissed her case in 1980. ld.
She filed another lawsuit in 1985, after Japan changed its pension laws. ld. at 174 This
suit was dismissed by the Osaka District Court in 1994, the Osaka High Court in 1996,
and the Supreme Court in 2001. See Top Court Rejects Blind Ex-Korean National's
Pensions Claim, KYODO NEWS AGENCY , Mar. 13, 2001, http://www.lexisnexis.com
(Follow "Find A Source," query "Japan Economic Newswire," query "court and blind
ex-Korean") (last accessed Mar. 26, 2011); Hyon Sun lm v. Governor of Kyoto, 1993
HANREI JIH6 104 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 2007). Hyon and four other elderly resident
Korean plaintiffs are suing to gain access to old age pensions; Kyoto Court Dismisses
Korean Residents' Claim over Denial of Pension, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 23,
2007, http://www.lexisnexis.com (Follow "Find A Source," query "Japan Economic
Newswire," query "Kyoto court dismisses Korean") (last accessed Mar. 26, 2011).
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refuse to extend pension rights to resident Korean claimants and
refuse to find the existing pension scheme illegal. These lawsuits
do not reflect well on the idea that courts can substantively
entrench international human rights in order to contradict or
overrule domestic policies that plainly violate treaty tenns.
On occasion, courts have used their verdict to appeal to the
Diet to bring about changes. For instance, a resident Korean
veteran from World War II challenged the government's refusal to
provide him a pension?44 Kang Bu-jung applied for a pension to
cover an injury sustained while he served in the Japanese Navy
during World War Il. 245 Kang was a Japanese citizen when he
received the mJury, but lost his citizenship with the
denationalization of all Koreans in 1952. 246 That meant he was no
longer able to receive a military pension under the Assistance
Law. 247 He applied for a pension in 1993, but was turned down
because of the nationality requirement of the 1952 Assistance
Law.24s
On appeal, the Osaka High Court noted that the right to
equality enshrined in Article 26 of the ICCPR and A.Iiicle 2(1) of
the ICESCR was cotenninous with that enshrined in A.Iiicle 14 of
the Japanese Constitution, which guarantees the right to
equality. 249 The court further determined that the ICESCR was not
binding on Japanese courts, due to its language about progressive
achievement, and hence its antidiscrimination provisions could not
support the finding of an illegal violation. 250 It did state, however,
that the Assistance Law's exclusion of Kang, based on his
nationality, "may have violated A.Iiicle 14 of the Constitution and
A1iicle 26 of the ICCPR," both of which guarantee the right to
244 See Kang, 1718 HANREI JIHO at 42. See generalZv Nonpayment of War Pensions
to Koreans Unconstitutional, ASIAN PoL. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999.
245 Id.See Kang, 1718 HANREI JIH6 at 42. See generally Nonpayment of war
Pensions to Koreans Unconstitutional, ASIAN PoL. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999.
246 Jd.
247 The 1952 Law for Assistance to War Victims and Their Bereaved Families
required that recipients of assistance hold Japanese citizenship. See lWASA WA, supra
note 113, at 176.
248 See Nonpayment of War Pensions supra note 244.
249 See Kang, 1718 HANREI JIHO at 48. See generally Nonpayment of War Pensions
to Koreans Unconstitutional, ASIAN PoL. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999.
250 Id. at 50.
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equality. 251 The court further "requested the Diet to take
legislative measures to correct the legal treatment of these
people. " 252
While the court specifically rejected the notion that the
ICESCR could have direct or indirect effect in this case, it
nonetheless fused the normative force of international law (the
binding ICCPR) with domestic constitutional law to suggest that
domestic law may have been illegal. 253 While this conclusion is
not as strong as, say, an outright finding of a violation, it
nonetheless represents progress in the ongoing domestication of
the nonns of international law. It also recalls the circuitous
criticism of the fingerprinting system discussed in the Yun
decision. 254 Japanese courts do not "call out" the political
branches as United States courts sometimes do, but their less
confrontational stance can signal disapproval with much the same
effect.
III. Conclusion: The Signaling Function of International Law
Minorities face a number of challenges in asserting their rights
in many jurisdictions. Quite apart from procedural impedimentsknowing one's rights, hiring a lawyer, trusting the legal system
enough to bring a claim-the legal system itself may offer limited
channels to challenge discriminatory policies or laws. That has
certainly been the case with minorities in the United States and
Japan. Given some of the structural obstacles that the domestic
legal system may pose to the protection of minority rights,
international human rights law can play a helpful role.
Intemational law provides a significant amount of support for the
entrenchment of various rights, both positive (the right to a
pension, the right to enjoy one's culture) and negative (the right
not to be discriminated against, the right not to be fingerprinted).
Intemational law has contributed to the diversification of
Japan, or at least to the expansion of protections of ethnic
minorities under Japanese law and litigation. The revision of
certain laws following ratification of key treaties has made most
251

Jd.

252

Jd.

253

Jd.

254

See supra notes 217-229 and accompanying text.
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resident Koreans eligible for Japan's social welfare. But where
Japan has not revised its laws to adhere to international standards,
the lawsuit offers a mechanism to challenge discriminatory laws
and an opportunity to register dissent over the unfairness of a
pmiicular policy. These lawsuits permit judges a chance to reflect
upon the constitutionality, sagacity, or desirability of the
discriminatory law or policy at issue. In practice, Japanese comis
rarely find a law unconstitutional, or chastise the Diet's failure to
pass protective legislation. When they do, it sends a strong
message to the legislature to review the offending law or policy.
Sometimes an issue must be litigated many times before the
underlying law is changed. Of course, not every suit brings about
the desired policy change, but it allows a challenge.
This is not the end of the story, of course, as judges often
decide just what form these international obligations will take, and
how they will interact with existing domestic laws. But in the
absence of real political power, as is the case for virtually all the
minorities discussed above, litigation provides a powerful tool to
challenge discriminatory laws and policies. In light of the fact that
many domestic laws and policies themselves discriminate against
minorities, recourse to international law helps buttress legal claims
and prods judges to expand their horizon of consideration above
the domestic plane. Litigation injects global standards into the
evaluation and disposition of domestic policies-concerns that
may be overlooked by the political process. The results are far
from ce1iain, and frequently do not favor the plaintiff. But
invoking international law provides a counterweight to a state that
has long prioritized the dominant ethnicity.

